Sign up for alerts tanks and heavy artillery, quickly succeeded in 'liberating' the major city of Aden and the Abyan province in the south, and in retaking control over the strategically important al-Anad military base. In all, the foreign intervention in support of President Hadi clearly tilted the balance in favour of the government forces at a time when the rebels had obtained control over most of the country's institutions.
II. The Positions of the Main Protagonists and the Reaction of Third States and International Organizations
As described above, President Hadi officially requested assistance in a letter to the GCC on 24 March 2015. In this letter, he accused the Houthi militias of 'being supported by regional Powers that are seeking to impose their control over the country', implicitly alluding to Iranian support. The letter continued:
The threat is therefore not only to the security of Yemen, but also to that of the entire region and to international peace and security … The Houthi militias have committed several acts of aggression, most recently deploying military columns to attack and take control of Aden and the rest of the south … I therefore appeal to you, and to the allied States that you represent, to stand by the Yemeni people as you have always done and come to the country's aid. I urge you, in accordance with the right of self-defence set forth in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and with the Charter of the League of Arab States and the Treaty on Joint Defence, to provide immediate support in every form and take the necessary measures, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the ongoing Houthi aggression, repel the attack that is expected at any moment on Aden and the other cities of the South, and help Yemen to confront Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
In their subsequent letter to the UN, the intervening states similarly held that the Houthi militias were 'supported by regional forces' and had 'always been a tool of outside forces', therefore establishing a 'threat … to the security, stability and sovereignty of Yemen, but also to the security of the region as a whole and to international peace and security'. Moreover: the acts of aggression have also affected Saudi Arabia, and the presence of heavy weapons and short and long-range missiles beyond the control of the legitimate authorities poses a grave and ongoing threat to our countries … They recently carried out large-scale military exercises using medium and heavy weapons, with live ammunition, near the Saudi Arabian border. The Houthi militias have already carried out a bare-faced and unjustified attack on the territory References (p. 902) of Saudi Arabia, in November 2009, and their current actions make it clear that they intend to do so again.
Consequently, these states 'decided to respond to President Hadi's appeal to protect Yemen and its great people from the aggression of the Houthi militias'. Whereas the statement drew attention to the request by President Hadi 'for immediate support in every form and for the necessary action to be taken in order to protect Yemen and its people from the aggression of the Houthi militias', subsequent declarations by both Yemen's Government-in-exile and Saudi Arabia explicitly mentioned the right to collective self-defence as a legal justification for Operation 'Decisive Storm'.
Third states and international organizations in large part lauded or, at least, acquiesced in the military intervention on Yemeni territory. In particular, the League of Arab States 'fully welcome [d] and support[ed] the military operations in defence of legitimate authority in Yemen … by the coalition composed of the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and a number of Arab States' and emphasized that the operation was 'grounded in the Arab Treaty of Joint Defense and Article 51 of the UN Charter'. This support was echoed by various western states. For example, the United States recognized that the action was taken 'to protect Yemen's legitimate government … at the request of Yemeni President … Hadi'. It then promptly announced 'the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC-led military operations'. Similarly, Prime Minister David Cameron also 'emphasised the [United Kingdom]'s firm political support for the Saudi action in Yemen', while Ministry of Defence officials later acknowledged that the state was 'providing technical support, precision-guided weapons and exchanging information with the Saudi Arabian armed forces'. Moreover, France stated that it '[stood] alongside its partners in the region in their efforts to restore Yemen's stability and unity', while Canada also endorsed the military action.
References
(p. 903) Some high-ranking representatives of international organizations and other third states adopted a more cautious stance, emphasizing that the conflict in Yemen could not be resolved militarily. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon noted that 'negotiations remain the only option for ultimately resolving the Yemeni crisis'. Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, also declared that 'military action is not a solution' and that '[o]nly a broad political consensus through negotiations can provide a sustainable solution'. China expressed the hope that the parties would 'resolve the current crisis through political dialogues'. Oman was the only GCC member state that refrained from participating in the intervention, since this would preclude the state from 'work[ing] on peace efforts'.
Outspoken criticism of the operation was, however, noticeably absent, barring few exceptions. Unsurprisingly, Iran accused the intervention of occurring 'in flagrant defiance of … international law … in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force', and condemned the 'aggression against Yemen' before the UNSC. Russia called upon all parties to 'immediately cease any forms of warfare and give up attempts to achieve their goals through military force'. It later declared that the Saudi-led operation had 'no legal foundation'. More cautiously, the Iraqi President stated that 'the problem of Yemen is within Yemen'. This was in line with the comments made by its Foreign Minister, who claimed that 'bringing external forces is not right' as it was the position of Iraq to 'resort to … non-interference in Yemen's internal affairs'.
The UNSC issued a Presidential Statement mere days before the launch of Operation Decisive Storm, in which it called on 'all Member States to refrain from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability [in Yemen]'. However, Resolution 2216 (2015), adopted weeks after the start of operations, expressly noted both the letter of President Hadi requesting military assistance and the letter from intervening states in response. Although this reference cannot be read as an authorization ex post facto, the Council clearly did not denounce the intervention either. This muted reaction was 
III. Questions of Legality
In spite of the scope and intensity of the operation, academic scrutiny of Operation Decisive Storm was surprisingly scarce and mostly confined to the blogosphere. Most blog posts quickly discarded the self-defence argument(s) as inapplicable in the Yemen case, and instead focused on the intervention by invitation argument. Each of the possible legal bases is addressed separately below.
Right to collective self-defence pursuant to armed attack(s) against Yemen?
As mentioned above, the principal intervening states expressly invoked the right to collective self-defence against the 'Houthi aggression' to justify their intervention. At the same time, given that the armed conflict was waged by Yemenis against Yemenis prior to the coalition's intervention, commentators found it difficult to see how the incumbent government could have validly requested allied nations to come to its aid militarily under the framework of the right to collective self-defence. Thus, Deeks regarded the reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter as 'odd' and 'misplaced', seeing it as 'a way to divert blame away from a regime's own internal failures'. There indeed appeared to be no indications (including in the statements of the intervening states) that the attacks by the Houthi rebels emanated from abroad, or that they had any cross-border features, thus casting doubt as to the existence of an 'armed attack' (which presupposes some external component).
Even so, the question remains whether the required external component could be derived from a high degree of third-state involvement in the attacks carried out by the Houthi rebels. This hypothesis refers to the concept of 'indirect military aggression', as envisaged by Article 3(g) of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Definition of Aggression. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) famously used this provision in the Nicaragua case as the basis to determine the permissibility of self-defence in a proxy warfare context:
[A]n armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, 'or its substantial involvement therein'.
While the Court ostensibly urged a restrictive reading of the concept of indirect military aggression by excluding 'the provision of weapons or logistical or other support', this narrow approach was subsequently criticized by dissenting Judges Jennings and Schwebel, and has further come under strain in post-Cold War practice.
Some scholars have since suggested that the criterion might include support that is essential in the group's ability to commit (what could be qualified as) an armed attack. Reference is sometimes made in this regard to the 'overall control' test as laid down by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case, and which encompasses that 'a State has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support'. While this test was primarily developed for purposes of determining whether an armed conflict should be regarded as 'international' or 'noninternational' for jus in bello purposes, its application could be extended to the field of the jus ad bellum. Put differently: a state's overall control over a non-state armed group potentially internationalizes a non-international armed conflict, and might thus constitute the necessary external component for the existence of an armed attack.
However, even if one accepts such broad interpretation of the concept of indirect military aggression, it remains doubtful whether third-state support for the Houthi campaign was sufficiently substantial to 'externalize' the Houthi attacks, thus triggering the right of self-defence. Indeed, even leaving aside the fact that the third state (read: Iran) allegedly providing assistance to the Houthi rebels was not even mentioned by name in the 26 March statement, as well as the fact that Iran categorically denied any and all accusations, it must be observed that several states concerned seemed to implicitly acknowledge that Iran's alleged involvement did not meet the tentative threshold set out above. 
Right to individual and collective self-defence pursuant to an (imminent) armed attack against Saudi Arabia?
A second justification hinted at by the intervening states, was the right to individual and collective self-defence in defence of Saudi Arabia. The Houthi uprising, and, in particular, the 'presence of heavy weapons … beyond the control of the legitimate authorities' allegedly posed 'a grave and ongoing threat' to GCC member states. The existence of such a threat was recognized by the US statement, which referred to the need to 'defend Saudi Arabia's border', and (indirectly) by Resolution 2216 (2015) which demanded that the Houthis 'refrain from any … threats to neighbouring States, including through … stockpiling weapons in any bordering territory'.
Acceptance of the second self-defence argument nonetheless presupposes two things. First, it assumes an acceptance that a non-state armed group, such as the Houthi rebels, is capable of mounting an 'armed attack' in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter, triggering the right of self-defence, of its own, irrespective of any state involvement. This view is not without support in contemporary state practice or legal doctrine, albeit that the permissibility of self-defence against attacks by non-state actors remains the subject of considerable discussion.
Second, inasmuch as no claims were made that there had been any actual Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia in the period preceding the launch of Operation Decisive Storm, the validity of the individual self-defence argument is premised on the view that the right of selfdefence applies not only in the case of actual (past or ongoing) armed attacks, but References (p. 907) also to threats of attack. The permissibility of so-called 'anticipatory' self-defence has been subject to debate throughout the entire Charter era, with legal doctrine being divided between those pointing to the texte clair of Article 51 of the UN Charter and others pointing at an allegedly broader right of self-defence under customary international law.
An in-depth analysis of this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to note that in the post-9/11 era, support for some form of anticipatory self-defence has increased, both in legal doctrine, as well as in state practice. At the same time, support for anticipatory selfdefence is generally construed along the lines of the famous 'Caroline' formula, which presupposes that an attack is 'imminent'. The ostensible attempt in the 2002 US National Security Strategy to broaden the exercise of self-defence to certain 'non-imminent' threats was broadly rejected by states and scholars alike (and appears to have subsequently been revoked by the United States ).
In the present case no evidence was brought forward to suggest that the Houthis were planning any armed attack against Saudi Arabia, let alone that it had already entered the implementation phase and could be regarded as 'imminent'. Instead, the coalition merely presented indications of a potentially hostile attitude, that is, the build-up of Houthi military presence in the border region, or presented the Houthi coup in general terms 'as a threat to the security and sovereignty of Yemen, the security of the Gulf and international peace and security'. It follows that, even if one accepts that attacks by non-state armed groups can of themselves qualify as 'armed attacks' triggering the right of selfdefence, and even if one accepts the legality of anticipatory self-defence against 'imminent' attacks (which remains controversial ), Operation Decisive Storm still cannot be construed as a proper application of the right of self-defence. Vermeer similarly concludes that the self-defence claim appears 'weak', since 'there has been no armed attack on Saudi Arabia emanating from Yemen, nor is one imminent'.
Intervention by invitation
A final (and ostensibly more straightforward) legal argument that was put forward to justify the military intervention relied upon the consent by President Hadi to allow the use of force by foreign states on Yemeni territory. This was also treated by most commentators References (p. 908) as the principal justification for Operation Decisive Storm (or the 'most promising' legal justification, as one author put it).
It is generally accepted that valid state consent to the use of force on its territory precludes a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Support for the permissibility of so-called 'intervention by invitation' doctrine can be found in Article 3(e) of the UNGA Definition of Aggression, the practice of the UNSC, ICJ jurisprudence, and legal doctrine. At the same time, this 'legalizing effect' of state consent depends on its intrinsic validity, which requires, inter alia, that consent for the act must emanate from the highest authorities of the state. In situations of grave internal turmoil, however, it can be unclear whether the embattled government can still (claim to) represent the state for such purposes. Two, interrelated, criteria are generally considered decisive in that regard. First, the consenting entity needs to exercise effective control over the state's territory. This logically excludes intervention by invitation in a situation of complete state failure or anarchy. Second, the entity needs to enjoy widespread international recognition. The position adopted by international organizations, and the UN in particular, is often regarded as holding significant probative value in that regard.
In the present case, it was clear in late March 2015 that the Hadi government had lost effective control over significant parts of the territory, even if forces loyal to the exiled government continued resisting the rebel advance, especially in the south and east of the country. Still, it must be recalled that international law traditionally maintains a presumption in favour of the established government 'so long as the civil war, whatever its prospects, is in progress'. Furthermore, it has been observed that the 'legitimacy of origin' of a government can, to some extent, 'offset its lack of effectiveness'. In this context, it is clear that the Hadi government retained international recognition as evidenced by Resolution 2216 (2015), which unequivocally reaffirmed 'its support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi'.
Writing shortly after the operation was launched, Chesney noted that '[s]ome might quibble with the authority of Hadi' to request outside intervention, but nonetheless found the legal basis to be 'strong'. Deeks for her part found that the consent was 'not as robust Leaving aside the intrinsic validity of Hadi's request, a second factor complicated the legality of the intervention. A large share of legal doctrine indeed accepts that customary international law prohibits third-states from intervening militarily in support of any party embroiled in a civil war, including the incumbent regime. This is sometimes referred to as the 'negative equality' doctrine. According to this view, the principle of non-intervention and the right to self-determination proscribe such assistance, given that the former prohibits 'interference in civil strife in another State', whereas the latter prescribes that '[a]ll peoples have the right [to] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'. The underlying idea is that the latter right is enjoyed by 'peoples' and can therefore not be freely disposed of by government consent.
A second school of thought, however, firmly opposes such a reading of international law, arguing instead that it remains permissible to provide foreign military aid to the de jure authorities (as opposed to aiding rebel forces), even in situations of civil war. First, these scholars argue that this approach best corresponds to 'traditional international law'. Second, they postulate that modern state practice flatly discredits the alleged customary prohibition on military assistance to a government in times of (civil) war. Reference in this regard has been made to recent interventions in Mali (2013) and Iraq (2014).
(p. 910) If this latter ('government-preference') approach is followed, the Saudi-led intervention would prima facie appear lawful. Conversely, if one opts for the 'negative equality' approach-which, in the view of the present authors, is more convincing-this does not necessarily imply that Operation Decisive Storm was unlawful. Indeed, even proponents of the 'negative equality' theory widely accept that the assumed prohibition of providing pro-government assistance in a civil war no longer applies in case of prior third-state aid to rebel forces. The concept of 'counter-intervention' stands as the theory's best established exception, though possibly also the most abused. Importantly, state practice suggests that in order to justify a 'counter-intervention', the prior support to the non-state armed group need not rise to the level which is required to 'externalize' an armed attack in the context of indirect military aggression (see above). In light of the foregoing, it could be argued that the alleged Iranian support to the Houthi rebels would effectively justify some form of counter-intervention in support of the recognized Yemeni Government.
In the present authors' view, however, the foregoing analysis does not imply that Operation Decisive Storm was fully compatible with international law. While this is an issue which has received little attention in legal doctrine, normatively, a strong argument can indeed be made that any 'counter-intervention' should be subject to a proportionality test, as is the case for other forms of self-help such as self-defence and countermeasures. In the present case, however, the coalition's pro-Hadi assistance, which included months-long air raids, a crippling air and naval blockade, and even boots-on-the-ground, undeniably dwarfed any Iranian involvement, even if all rumours thereof are accepted as fact. Accordingly, the Yemeni people were arguably not allowed to freely decide their (political) future, through 'a physical contest if necessary', inasmuch as the intervention did not aim exclusively at cancelling out alleged interference by Iran, but rather sought to defeat the Houthi rebel movement and restore Hadi to power. On balance then, even if one accepts that the Saudi-led operation constituted a 'counter-intervention', it would appear manifestly disproportionate to the alleged Iranian aid to the Houthi rebels. As such, the Saudi-led operation could not be justified by reliance upon any of the established exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force, and rather constituted a (serious) violation of the jus contra bellum.
IV. Conclusion: Precedential Value
The Saudi-led intervention on Yemeni territory met with approval or, at least, acquiescence by the majority of states, with only few exceptions.
Although the intervening states expressly referred to the right of self-defence, reliance on the latter legal basis seems rather 'odd' and 'misplaced'. Absent any in-depth debate of the self-defence argument, and seeing as 'intervention by invitation' would seem to provide a more straightforward legal basis, it is submitted that little can be drawn from the Yemen precedent in terms of the interpretation of the right of self-defence. In particular, (p. 911) the Yemen case should not be interpreted as precedent in support of a broad right of self-defence against non-imminent threats posed by non-state actors abroad.
As far as the request by President Hadi is concerned, it is recalled that it was made at a time when his government had lost control over significant parts of the territory, and that he was forced to flee the country days after issuing the request. In spite hereof, it appears that the request was mostly regarded as valid, due to the fact that Hadi continued to enjoy unequivocal international recognition by the international community. This leads to the tentative conclusion that such widespread international recognition can ostensibly compensate for substantial loss of control over territory for the purposes of remaining the state's sole, legitimate representative, including for purposes of requesting outside military support (although some have-rightly-cautioned that this introduces an element of subjectivity in the legal framework).
Furthermore, having regard to supportive/acquiescent attitude of other states vis-à-vis the operation, in spite of its taking place against the background of an ongoing civil war, some will be tempted to conclude that this precedent offers yet more evidence that the 'negative equality' doctrine is not, and has never been, supported by state practice and opinio juris. However, taking into account the alleged Iranian involvement, the better view seems to be that the operation constituted an example of that doctrine's best established exception, that is, 'counter-intervention', and should not be regarded as evidence that de jure authorities can lawfully request outside military support in situations of civil war.
At the same time, having regard to the scope and intensity of the Saudi-led intervention, the Yemen case certainly raises the question whether a counter-intervention is subject to a proportionality test. According to the present authors, the answer must be affirmative if the concept of counter-intervention is to be more than an empty shell.
Footnotes:
This chapter is a revised version of a more comprehensive article: Tom 
